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RECENT DECISIONS
title as against the defendant, and was entitled to judgment in that
amount. Freeport Bank of Freeport v. Viemeister, 227 App. Div.
457, 238 N. Y. Supp. 169 (2nd Dept. 1929).
Upon certification of the check the bank guaranteed that it had
sufficient funds to pay the check and agreed that those funds would
not be withdrawn to the prejudice of the holder of the check;' it
became responsible unconditionally for the payment thereof. The
certification was a sufficient consideration under the Negotiable Instruments Law 2 and was, therefore, value within the meaning of
that law 3 to the extent that the depositor's account would be overdrawn except insofar as defendant's check covered such withdrawal.
This result came about by a waiver of the restriction by the bank
and transforming defendant's check, which was originally subject to
collection, into an absolute and unconditional credit to its depositor
to the extent necessary to make good the check which it had certified
and for payment of which it was responsible. 4 While a bank cannot
pay moneys to a payee after notice of an infirmity in an instrument
to constitute itself a holder in due course, 5 if the proceeds are used
to make good the depositor's account, the bank becomes a holder for
value. 6 The bank in the instant case was, therefore, a holder for
value within the meaning of the Negotiable Instruments Law 7 and
could recover the amount paid against the defendant's check before
notice of dishonor.
J. A. S.
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ABSCONDING HUSBAND.-The Commissioner of Public Welfare made

complaint that a certain individual had abandoned his wife and infant
child while residing in New York City, and had absconded from the
state, leaving them without means and likely to become public charges
unless relieved. Upon the wife's supporting affidavit, a warrant was
issued by the Magistrate's Court authorizing the seizure of all the
absconding husband's right, title and interest in his deposit with
1

Cullinan v. Union Surety & Guaranty Co., 79 App. Div. 409, 80 N. Y.
Supp. 58 (4th Dept. 1903).
- Secs. 51, 112, 323 (L. 1909, Ch. 43).
'Ibid. Sec. 91.
'Bath Nat. Bank v. Ely N. Sonnenstrahl, Inc., 249 N. Y. 391, 164 N. E.
327 (1928); Heinrich v. First Nat. Bank of Middletown, 219 N. Y. 1, 113
N. E. 531 (1916); Merchants' Nat. Bank of St. Paul v. Santa Maria Sugar
Co., 162 App. Div. 248, 147 N. Y. Supp. 498 (1914); American Trust &
Savings Bank v. Austin, 25 Misc. 454, 456, 55 N. Y. Supp. 561 (1898).
Albany County Bank v. People's Co-operative Ice Co., 92 App. Div. 47,
86 N. Y. Supp. 773 (1904).
6Wallabout Bank v. Peyton, 123 App. Div. 727, 108 N. Y. Supp. 42 (1908).
Secs. 93, 96 (L. 1909, Ch. 43).
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appellant bank and to make return to the County Court. After service and demand the bank refused to pay. The Commissioner then
sought to reduce the fund to his possession. The bank moved for
judgment contending that the statute,' upon which the warrant was
granted, was unconstitutional, violating the due process clause of the
14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Section 6, of the New York State Constitution, in that it failed to
provide for notice, either actual or constructive, to the absconder.
Held, the statute is constitutional even though there is no provision
for notice, as the absconder may set aside the entire adjudication if
the necessary jurisdictional facts do not exist. Corn Exchange
Bank v. Coler, 280 U. S. 218, 50 Sup. Ct. Rep. 94 (1930), aff'g
250 N. Y. 136, 164 N. E. 882 (1929).
In 1718, the English Parliament, recognizing the fact that abanmight
donment by husbands and fathers of their wives and children
2
cause them to become public charges, enacted a statute which gave
the church warden and overseer of the poor the power to seize such
property and assets of the absconder as would be necessary for the
support and maintenance of the wife and children. This statute was
subsequently enacted in substantially the same form by the Colonial
Legislature of New York. After the separation from England, the4
state legislature passed a similar statute," which was later re-enacted,
and then brought down, and broadened in scope, in the Code of
Criminal Procedure. 5 Justice McReynolds, writing for the Supreme
Court, bases his decision principally on the antiquity of the statute
and the fact that heretofore it has been unchallenged. The Court
quoted from Owenby v. Morgan 6 that "however desirable it is that
the old forms of procedure be improved with the progress of time,
it cannot rightly be said that the Fourteenth Amendment furnishes
a universal and self-executing remedy. Its function is negative, not
affirmative and it carries no mandate for particular measures of
reform. * * * Neither does it, as we think, require a state to relieve
the hardship of an ancient and familiar method of procedure by dis'Code of Crim. Proc., Secs. 921-925. These sections provide, in substance, that the Commissioner of Public Welfare may apply to the Magistrate's Court for a warrant to seize the property of an absconding husband or
parent leaving a wife or child likely to become public charges and that upon
the proper jurisdictional facts being found, the warrant be issued. Provision is
further made for the means of seizure, confirmation by the County Court and
supervision of the application of the proceeds. It is also provided that in the
event the party against whom the warrant issued should return, he may, upon
proper application, set aside the entire proceeding if he can prove the failure
of jurisdictional facts.
25 George I, Ch. 8 (1718).
'Act of April 17, 1784.
'Laws 1788, Ch. 62.
'Act of April 8, 1813, R. L., Ch. 78, Sec. 22; 1 R. S., Ch. 20, Title 1,
Secs. 8, 9 (1829).
'256 U. S. 94, 112, 415 Sup. Ct. Rep. 433-438 (1921).
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pensing with the exaction of special security from an appearing
defendant in a foreign attachment." Referring to the bank's position, the Supreme Court said that although the bank may be called
upon to pay twice, it is no reason for declaring the statute unconstitutional, as when it contracted with the depositor, it was cognizant of
the statute and its effect, and it voluntarily accepted the consequent
responsibility. The Court indicates that though the statute is constitutional, it is, nevertheless, a harsh measure. We fail to appreciate the alleged hardship. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, T
the husband having chosen New York State as his domicile, he is
deemed to submit and acquiesce in any law of the state affecting his
property, which is or may be in force. If he subsequently abandons
his wife and child in this state and they are so destitute that they may
become public charges, the state, in furtherance of the welfare of the
community and under a proper exercise of its police power, may
sequester his property and use the same for the support and maintenance of his wife and family. The basic facts upon which such
relief may be granted are: (a) The marital relationship and domicile
within the state; (b) the abandonment by husband or parent and his
absence from the state; (c) the necessary property or res within the
state. In this type of proceeding the absconder is represented by the
bank which may set up such defenses as would be available to him.
He is not divested of his right, upon his return, to nullify the entire
proceeding if he can prove the absence of the necessary jurisdictional
facts. What the legislature intended was to provide for the case
where a husband had property within the state and was concealing
himself or had disappeared, leaving a wife and family without means
and a possibility of becoming public charges, despite the fact that the
property may be sufficient to properly provide for them. Under
such circumstances, to render the property inaccessible to them, would
severely tax one's sense of fairness and justice. Lack of remedy in
such a case would mark the law as impotent.
E. H. L.

CORPORATIONS-RIGHT OF CORPORATION TO PURCHASE ITS OWN

STocK.-Upon the authority of a resolution of its board of directors,
a corporation contracted with one of its stockholders to purchase his
holdings at a specified sum. At the date of the execution of the contract, the corporation's surplus was in excess of the price agreed upon.
Plaintiff delivered his stock to the corporation and received part of the
stipulated payments. The corporation thereafter became financially
embarrassed and its assets were turned over to a creditors' committee
which took over the management and control of the corporation and
sold its assets. Included in the assets sold were the shares formerly
owned by plaintiff. At the time of the assignment it was agreed
7250

N. Y. 136, 164 N. E. 882 (1929), opinion by Cardozo, Ch. J.

